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ABSTRACT 
The Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations (IO) 
states that both IO planning and targeting should be fully 
integrated with all joint planning and targeting efforts.  
However, this thesis’ research with IO Subject Matter 
Expertise (SME) on IO targeting and practice suggests the 
existence of a fracture in the integration process. The most 
challenging doctrinal, technical, and practical integration 
challenge stems from the second phase of the Joint Targeting 
Cycle:  Target Development & Prioritization. In response to 
this challenge, this study proposes five recommendations to 
enhance IO integration into the Joint Targeting Cycle: the 
use of interim IO Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual 
(JMEM) techniques to better forecast cognitive effects, the 
adoption of the Measure of Worth (MOW) model to assess IO 
effects, the HOT methodology to develop and prioritize IO 
targets, the use of compendium software facilitate targeting 
problem understanding and the network analysis tool, 
Palantir, as an efficient and tailored semi-automated means 
to holistically prioritize and develop targets.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THE CHALLENGE OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS TARGETING 
The Global War on Terror (GWOT) fathered a fascinating 
series of observations concerning the common perception of 
the conflict’s complexity.  Many of the GWOT’s participants 
have developed the tendency to equate the war with not only 
playing chess, but playing a game of “three-dimensional” 
chess.1  One British general officer took it one step 
further by stating, 
It's hard pounding. This is as complex as I've 
ever seen anything I've ever done. This is really 
difficult. This is three-dimensional chess in a 
dark room.2  
In the majority of the chess metaphor references, it 
was never mentioned that they had to possibly compete 
against a fellow player in a difficult game. Thousands of 
years of recorded human history have demonstrated that 
humans are ruthlessly cunning, resourceful and smart.  
Therefore, the mechanics of chess itself is not the source 
of complexity; instead, the complexity derives from the 
mental abilities of your opponent. The frequency of the 
chess metaphor suggests an increased challenge in addressing 
the human element of warfare.  Many of these challenges 
possess intangible qualities because they reside outside the 
                     
1 Some references include the phrase “four-dimensional chess” to 
possibly include time as the fourth dimension in addition to the three 
spatial dimensions. 
2 DefenseLink News Transcript: DoD News Briefing with Lt. Gen. Lamb 




physical domain. This chess anecdote supports the growing 
relevance of informational and cognitive domains.  
Shifting to macro view of the GWOT, the United States’ 
grand strategy continually emphasizes the importance of 
information.  Campaign names such as Operations IRAQI 
FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM promote the concept of ideology 
as an instrument of national power.  Even the phrase GWOT 
itself possesses clear informational relevance.  After all, 
terror is not a physical enemy, but a tactic.3  Therefore, 
in addition to the tactical and operational levels of war, 
one observes an increasing role for strategic military 
operations in the information and cognitive domains. Across 
the levels of war, it is the convergence of the physical, 
information, and cognitive domains that ultimately produces 
the GWOT’s complexity.   
Information Operations, or IO, operates in the areas 
where the physical, informational, and cognitive domains 
converge.  IO is described as the integrated employment of 
Electronic Warfare (EW), Computer Network Operations (CNO), 
Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Military Deception 
(MILDEC), and Operations Security (OPSEC), in concert with 
specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, 
disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated 
decision making while protecting our own.4  On closer 
examination, the process of IO targeting represents the 
implementation level where targets residing in the physical, 
informational and cognitive domains are prosecuted. 
                     
3 Bard E. O'Neill. Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern 
Revolutionary Warfare. Washington: Brassey's (US), 1990.  
4 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations. 
(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006). 
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Doctrinally, IO’s targeting process is executed through the 
joint targeting cycle.  The joint targeting cycle is a six 
phase process designed to select and prioritize targets in 
order to match an appropriate response with given 
operational objectives and environments.5   
Phase two of the joint targeting cycle involves the 
development and prioritization of targets.  This phase 
identifies, researches, develops, “vetts” and validates 
potential targets for approval and action during a given 
time period.6 Although these actions can apply to any target 
residing in the physical, informational, and cognitive 
domain, IO target development and prioritization possesses 
nuances that account for the multiple domain convergence. 
Although we know chess’s eventual purpose is to successfully 
target and cause a favorable effect upon the opposing 
player’s king, the greatest challenge lies in knowing where, 
when, and how to target an opponent’s piece as part of an 
overall coherent campaign to produce the conditions for  
ultimate victory.  Since the joint targeting cycle makes no 
distinction between lethal and non-lethal effects, IO’s 
doctrine, supporting technology, and practices serve as 
significant inputs to second phase of the joint targeting 
cycle. 
When viewing military doctrine, technology and 
practice, determining the actual cause and effect inter-
relationships between these three areas becomes a 
tautological exercise.   Does military doctrine drive 
technology and practice or vice versa?  If one subscribes to 
                     
5 United States. Joint Targeting. Joint pub, 3-60. [Washington, 
D.C.]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007. 
6 Ibid. 
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the “necessity is the mother of invention” philosophy, then 
perhaps practice drives doctrine and technology.  One could 
obtain better success in proving that the chicken did in 
fact come before the egg, or vice versa. In order to achieve 
the integrated employment of IO’s capabilities, doctrine, 
technology and practice must be aligned.   
From an IO target development and prioritization 
position, a dilemma arises when the current doctrine, 
technology and practice are not efficiently aligned to 
better support the commander’s objectives.  This possible 
fissure generated the primary research questions for this 
research.   
• What modifications to the joint targeting cycle 
are required for the efficient integration of IO 
target development and prioritization?   
• Does the current definition and practice of 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) lack the ability 
to ascertain actual progress towards meeting a 
targeting effect or objective?  
• Do the contradictory aspects of IO core, 
supporting and related capabilities preclude the 
use of a holistic target development and 
prioritization method? 
• Is there an automated or software solution to 
translate doctrine into practice while still 
incorporating existing and emerging technology? 
Based upon research and examination of current IO 
doctrine and targeting practice, this thesis determined that 
inconsistencies existed in both the doctrine and practice.  
The role of technology, an essential element of IO’s core, 
supporting and related competencies, only magnifies the 
divide.  On a favorable note, the existing doctrine and 
practice does provide sufficient flexibility to permit more 
 5
efficient target development and prioritization solutions.  
This doctrinal flexibility serves as the maneuver space for 
interim and durable IO target development and prioritization 
recommendations.    
In this maneuver space, this thesis puts forward five 
recommendations to enhance IO target development and 
prioritization:  the use of interim IO JMEM techniques to 
better forecast cognitive effects, the adoption of the 
Measure of Worth (MOW) model to assess IO effects, the HOT 
methodology to guide target development and prioritization, 
the use of compendium software facilitate targeting problem 
understanding and the network analysis tool, Palantir, as an 
efficient and tailored semi-automated means to holistically 
prioritize and develop targets. The recommendations made to 
improve IO phase two target development and prioritization 
possess the following caveat:  
On this uneven playing field, we will be 
confronted by enemies who adhere to no rules, 
while many of our actions or inactions may have 
strategic consequences.  Accordingly, the Marine 
Corps cannot be wedded to a particular method or 
mode of war. It cannot assume there will be 
technological silver bullets or doctrinal 
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II. UNDERSTANDING INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) 
TARGETING  
A. IO BACKGROUND 
1. Joint Information Operations (IO) Doctrine 
Prior to examining the joint doctrine for IO, it is 
best to explain the purpose and framework of doctrine in the 
military profession.  From a joint definition, doctrine 
consists of the fundamental principles by which the military 
forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of 
national objectives.   It is authoritative, but requires 
judgment in application.8  Alternatively, the United States 
Marine Corps puts forward that doctrine establishes the 
fundamental beliefs on the subject of war and the practice 
of that profession.9  Despite the difference between 
principles and beliefs in the respective doctrinal 
definition, both viewpoints heavily convey a sense of 
collective necessity in its eventual application.  For this 
thesis, doctrine will be viewed and utilized as a common 
understanding in the approach of achieving a commander’s 
stated objective or intent.  From this definition, doctrine 
should never be prescriptive.  Instead, it must possess 
adaptive qualities to ensure the functional applicability of 
the stated common view across a full range of situations.   
                     
8 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 
2007, Defense Technical Information Center. 
9 United States Marine Corps, Tactics (Washington, DC, U.S. Marine 
Corps, 1997). 
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Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations is the 
source document for all joint IO doctrine.  From this 
publication, IO’s principal objective is to gain and 
maintain informational superiority for the United States and 
its allies.10  In keeping with importance of the integration 
of IO, the Joint Publication 3-13 presents two main points.  
First, it stresses the use of the Joint Operational Planning 
Execution System (JOPES), the joint targeting cycle and 
targeting coordination board for all IO planning and 
coordination. Secondly, in planning and execution, the 
publication treats IO as a single entity. Although the JP 3-
13 identifies and separates the core, supporting and 
relating IO capabilities, it adopts a general approach to 
better facilitate the goal of integrated employment.11  
Since the thesis’ primary research questions focus on phase 
two of the joint targeting cycle, the research will next 
look at joint targeting doctrine. 
2. Joint Targeting Doctrine 
Joint Publication 3-60; Joint Targeting is the lead 
document for all joint targeting doctrine.  Even though this 
thesis makes an emphasis by prefacing the term targeting 
with the words IO or non-lethal, joint doctrine makes no 
such distinction.  Joint targeting possesses four principles 
stating that all targeting should be focused, effects-based, 
interdisciplinary and systematic.  In examining the 
targeting process as it relates to IO, some key points 
                     
10 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations. 
(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006). 
11 Information Operations Roadmap publication, 2003, Dept. of 
Defense. 
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emerge. First, IO’s inherent cognitive complexity impedes 
the traditional targeting capability to effectively align 
effects with objectives.  Secondly, from an informational 
and cognitive perspective, the term Measure of Effectiveness 
(MOE) struggles to accurately capture complete progress 
because it may only focus on indicators of positive 
attainment. Thirdly, beyond the usage of the joint targeting 
cycle, the doctrine does not advocate any adherence to a 
single targeting methodology. Finally, and most importantly, 
the four principles of joint targeting are equally 
applicable with all IO capabilities. In summary, no 
doctrinal conflict exists between IO and joint targeting.  
While some challenges exist in the integration of IO in the 
process, the JP 3-60 provides sufficient room to put forward 
doctrinally compliant solutions for the thesis’ primary 
research questions. 
3. Joint Targeting Cycle 
The joint targeting cycle is a logical six phase 
process designed to select and prioritize targets in order 
to match an appropriate response with given operational 
objectives and environments.12  Joint Publication 3-13 
suggests IO targeting should be integrated into the joint 
targeting cycle. From a targeting standpoint, an actual 
target is an entity or object considered for possible 
engagement or action.13  The term target can apply to 
adversarial, neutral or even possibly friendly entities or 
objects.  While the Joint Targeting Cycle is coherent, 
                     
12 United States. Joint Targeting. Joint pub, 3-60. [Washington, 
D.C.]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007. 
13 Ibid.  
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logical and procedurally effective, its origins primarily 
stem from aviation-delivered fires.  The cycle evolved from 
strategic bombing in the Second World War to its present day 
manifestation during the first Gulf War.14  The cycle’s 
origin suggests a vast long standing body of corporate 
knowledge on the lethal fires perspective of the cycle’s 
application.  This corporate knowledge is analogous to 
invisible glue that keeps the cycle together for efficient 
lethal targeting.  In its current form, the cycle represents 
an appropriate balance of art and science incorporating the 
principles of effects-based targeting, but it still does not 
effectively incorporate the information and cognitive 
domains(see Figure 1). Next, the thesis will briefly discuss 
each phase of the cycle through an IO lens followed by a 
brief summary of the results to promote greater 
understanding of this thesis’ major research questions. 
 
                     
14 Robert P. Winkler, Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.), Joint 
Advanced Warfighting School, and National Defense University., The 
Evolution of the Joint ATO Cycle, Joint Forces Staff College, Joint 
Advanced Warfighting School, 2006. 
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Figure 1.   The Joint Targeting Cycle15 
  
B. PHASE 1: END STATE AND COMMANDER’S OBJECTIVES 
The commander’s objective serves as the entire impetus 
for the targeting cycle.  The end state drives the targeting 
cycle, so that all subsequent phases should support the 
higher objective instead of performing targeting simply for 
the sake of targeting.  Of significance, once the targeting 
cycle has been initiated, the assessments from phase six of 
                     
15 United States. Joint Targeting. Joint pub, 3-60. [Washington, 
D.C.]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007. 
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the cycle directly influence the creation of future 
objectives.  Since, IO effects support the attainment of 
higher objectives, there are seldom pure IO objectives. 
Consequently, phase one outputs are identical for all types 
of targeting. In review, phase one of the joint targeting 
cycle efficiently translates in nearly all types of 
targeting examples. 
C. PHASE 2: TARGET DEVELOPMENT AND PRIORITIZATION 
Phase two presents the most intricate challenge in the 
integration of IO into the joint targeting cycle.  This 
phase identifies, researches, develops, vets and validates 
potential targets for approval and action during a given 
time period.16  Phase two requires significant rigor, 
intelligence fusion, and problem understanding to generate 
validated target sets. 
From a development perspective, potential targets in 
the informational and cognitive domain significantly differ 
from their physical counterparts.  If an informational 
domain is described by flow and content, a high probability 
exists that the informational target is part of a greater 
network.  A network represents a complex system that 
possesses physical, informational, and cognitive 
components. If the cognitive domain is described by values 
and beliefs, it is hard to isolate what the actual target 
is or is not. Consequently, IO target development adds 
increased complexity to an already difficult phase.  
                     
16 United States. Joint Targeting. Joint pub, 3-60. [Washington, 
D.C.]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007. 
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A similar challenge arises in the (now) nominated 
target’s prioritization. In both cases, the prioritization 
challenge is severe due to the intricacy of the solution.  
In many cases, the solution is not a definitive answer, but 
a best case approach based on a stakeholder’s position.  
These IO informational and cognitive nuances in the target 
development and prioritization phase suggest a distinct, 
but not doctrinally exceptional, methodology could aid in 
this phase. 
D. PHASE 3: CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS  
The purpose of the capabilities analysis is to weigh 
the relative effectiveness and efficiency of the available 
forces as an aid to achieving the objectives set forth by a 
commander.17  The analysis requires specialized knowledge 
about a given friendly asset or resource to achieve a stated 
effect.  In terms of proficiency, the capabilities analysis 
should seek efficiency while incorporating the potential 
overall risk to mission and friendly forces.  While many IO 
capabilities may lack the same broad degree of knowledge as 
an equivalent lethal fires asset, IO capability experts do 
exist.  Accordingly, from an IO perspective, the gap between 
lethal and non-lethal targeting can be crossed through a 
personnel staffing solution or through information sharing. 
E. PHASE 4: COMMANDER’S DECISION AND FORCE ASSIGNMENT 
Although the purpose of phase four is nearly self 
explanatory, some IO considerations should be brought 
forward.  In lethal targeting, the commander’s approval 
                     
17 United States. Joint Targeting. Joint pub, 3-60. [Washington, 
D.C.]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007. 
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authority and force assignment is tied to physical 
boundaries. However, many of IO capabilities can easily 
transcend physical boundaries.  Nearly every core, related 
and supporting capabilities possess a very large effects 
footprint. Beyond capabilities, IO can be employed not just 
in war, but in peacetime.  This full conflict spectrum makes 
IO targeting tied to other instruments of national power 
beyond military operations.  As a result of this factor, IO 
tends to require a higher level of approval authority.  In 
some cases, an IO capability’s approval authority may reside 
above the authority of the commander who is actually running 
the targeting cycle.  This IO distinction does not represent 
a doctrinal or methodological problem, but an approval 
coordination issue. 
F. PHASE 5: MISSION PLANNING AND FORCE EXECUTION 
The purpose of phase five is to task subordinates to 
execute a given targeting plan.  From a lethal perspective, 
tasked tactical commanders may have to conduct dynamic 
targeting within this phase.  This process is called find, 
fix, track, target, engage and assess or F2T2EA.18  High 
value or high payoff emerging targets found during F2T2EA 
can be identified for Time Sensitive Targeting (TST).  TST 
essentially compresses the joint targeting cycle within 
phase five to accommodate for the emerged target.19  While 
the concepts found in F2T2EA and TST can loosely translate 
into IO, they do not always procedurally match.  However, 
since the F2T2EA process is being done at the operator 
                     
18 United States. Joint Targeting. Joint pub, 3-60. [Washington, 
D.C.]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007. 
19 Ibid. 
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level, the actual sub steps contained in phase five, F2T2EA 
for non-lethal force application remain outside the purview 
of the targeting process.  Therefore at the phase level of 
the joint targeting cycle, phase five works for both lethal 
and non-lethal targeting.  As a result, IO may not be 
performing an exact version of F2T2EA, but still executes a 
functional equivalent. 
G. PHASE 6: ASSESSMENT 
 Phase six represents a considerable challenge for 
successful integration of IO in the joint targeting cycle.  
Since, by definition, targeting is the process of selecting 
and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate 
response while considering operational requirements and 
capabilities, one must be able to reasonably forecast an 
intended effect.20  A barrier to matching IO effects with 
objectives is the current unavailability of an effective IO 
Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM).21  A JMEM is a 
comprehensive source of information concerning weapon 
effectiveness, characteristics, and employment 
requirements.22  Since IO’s core, supporting and relating 
capabilities are both heavily resident in the information 
and cognitive domains and are diverse, it is a great 
challenge to possess a single source that can provide a 
corresponding IO measure of effectiveness, characteristics, 
and requirements.  The utility of an IO JMEM equivalent 
predicates itself on the assumption that the cognitive 
                     
20 United States. Joint Targeting. Joint pub, 3-60. [Washington, 
D.C.]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007. 
21 John Loper. “RE: IO JMEM.” E-mail to author. 12 August 2008. 
22 United States. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms. [Washington, D.C.]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007.  
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dimension, regardless of core, supporting and relating 
capability used, is the most important dimension.23 Due to 
the unpredictability of human nature, the current effects 
prediction barrier complicates the traditional application 
of targeting experience to the IO process.  Another IO 
problem related to phase six of the targeting cycle is the 
time required to collect, analyze and produce an accurate 
assessment.  Ideally, to make the cycle work, the output of 
phase six should be the input to phase one.  This is true in 
both the lethal and non-lethal targeting cases.  However, 
many IO capabilities such as PSYOPs and Civil Military 
Operations (CMO) may require months or years to receive 
accurate assessments.  In the context of the targeting 
cycle, this may not be timely enough to drive subsequent 
targeting evolutions.  To add more friction, in this interim 
period, subsequent cycles could have been altered the 
initial assessment.  While the concept of assessment is 
equally applicable in the lethal and non-lethal context, 
IO’s ability to render timely, accurate and relevant 
assessments to support the joint targeting cycle is far more 
difficult. 
H. SUMMARY OF IO PERSPECTIVE TO THE PHASES OF THE JOINT 
TARGETING CYCLE 
Doctrinally and functionally, IO works in all phases of 
the joint targeting cycle.  In terms of IO suitability, 
phases one and three possess no functional and doctrinal 
problems making them highly efficient cases.  Phases four 
and five represent cases where there are no doctrinal 
                     
23 United States. Naval Doctrine Publication 6: Naval Command and 
Control. Washington, DC: Dept. of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations and Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1995. 
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issues, or limited functional IO problems.  Though not a 
highly efficient case, these phase four and five functional 
problems can be solved through proper staff sourcing, 
integration, information management and approval authority 
procedures.  While the joint targeting doctrine supports the 
inclusion of IO in phases two and six, the phase’s 
functional problems could impede overall targeting 
efficiency.  Moving beyond the sequential phases of the 
cycle, the functional inefficiency of the two phases make 
them closely related.  If IO targets lack the complete 
ability to be assessed in phase six, they may also lack the 
ability to be originally developed in phase two.  This 
suggests that phase two target development requires a 
limited ability to forecast the desired effect in order to 
develop potential targets and then prioritize the validated 
targets.  Therefore, from an IO perspective a discrepancy 
exists not only in phases two and six, but between the two 
phases.  Depite their numerical order, phases two and six 
are directly linked in an IO targeting environment. 
This phase two and six discrepancy presents the 
greatest challenge but also possesses the greatest area for 
improvement.  While Joint Publication 3-13 states that the 
joint targeting cycle should be used, it does not specify an 
explicit doctrinal, methodological, or procedural means of 
how to work inside the two phases of the greater cycle. 
Additionally, the joint targeting cycle has always been a 
dynamic process.  The principles of Effects Based Targeting 
(EBT), Time Sensitive Targeting (TST) and Special Operations 
Force (SOF) targeting have put forward distinct best 
practices that work well within the greater joint targeting 
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cycle.24 This establishes a precedent for the incorporation 
of emerging Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs). In 
keeping with the scope of the thesis, the research will 
focus on the second phase of the joint targeting cycle, but 
will address elements of phases two and six that are 
interdependent. In looking at the discrepancies, the author 
researched comparable problems to gain a better research 
foundation and perspective. 
I. INFORMATION OPERATIONS TARGETING REPRSENTS A "WICKED 
PROBLEM" DILEMMA 
1. What are Wicked Problems and Social Messes? 
Interestingly, many characteristics of IO targeting 
phase two and six discrepancies also surface in the field of 
wicked problem sets.  After performing a literature review 
on the subject of wicked problems, three prominent 
perspectives on the topic emerged.  Rittel’s and Webber’s 
work in organizational development, titled Dilemmas in a 
General Theory of Planning, initially coined the term wicked 
problem.  Building upon Rittel and Webber’s work, Conklin’s 
book, Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared Understanding of 
Wicked Problems, essentially shares a mutual understanding 
of the overall belief, but expands on the body of research 
by addressing the area of a team’s shared understanding as 
                     
24 Targeting, 2006; U.S. Air Force, Joint special Operations Task 
Force Operations, 2007; Joint Chiefs of Staff., Commander's Handbook for 
Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting, 2002; United States Joint Forces 
Command, Joint Warfighting Center [and] Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, Joint Warfighters Joint Test and Evaluation, Integration of 
Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process, 2003; U.S. 
Army Command and General Staff College, Time Critical Targeting: 
Predictive vs. Reactionary Methods: An Analysis For The Future, 2002. 
Defense Technical Information Center. 
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it relates to wicked problem definition and approach.  Along 
a similar line of logic, Horn specifically looks at the 
social mess problem in a series of graphically oriented 
presentations or slides by employing visual analytics to 
better understand social problems.  Although the entire 
scope of research on this area is considerably profound,  
this thesis will only select and discuss specific wicked 
problem characteristics to promote a better understanding of 
the IO targeting problem. 
Wicked problems represent highly complex dilemmas that, 
when addressed, can only achieve a relative degree of 
success.  Wicked problems are dynamic, unstable and 
unpredictable.  First, intrinsic wicked problem complexity 
cannot be truly appreciated until an initial solution has 
been proposed.  This idea implies the use of an iterative or 
a continuous solution program.  However, due to the 
problem’s dynamic complexity, the previous iteration’s 
variables have already been altered, thereby inhibiting the 
likelihood of eventual or complete problem mastery.25  
Therefore, a given solution is generally applicable only 
once.  Second, wicked problems have no right or wrong 
answers.26  Instead, a proposed answer improves, worsens or 
maintains the undesirable symptoms of the root problem.  
Finally, in tackling wicked problems, one affects the very 
nature of the problem.    
An ever present element in the wicked problem involves 
social complexity.  Social complexity is a function of the 
                     
25 W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of 
Planning, (Berkeley: Institute of Urban & Regional Development, Un of 
California], 1972).  
26 Rittel.  
 20
number, position, background, organizational distinction, 
group dynamics and individual personalities of the team 
tasked to treat the wicked problem.27  The inherent 
diversity of social complexity tends to create divergent 
outlooks on problem definition. Without mutual understanding 
on problem definition, the likelihood of producing a 
satisfactory solution for all stakeholders remains unlikely.   
Another element to the wicked problem deals with 
technical complexity.28  Technical complexity does not 
relate to a single item of technology.  Instead, technical 
complexity involves the integration of the multiple 
components as part of larger system where each part 
possesses its own unique set of requirements.  It is a 
system of systems problems that absolutely requires a 
holistic approach to achieve a solution.  For example, in 
looking at Figure 2, one can visually appreciate the effect 
of technical complexity.  The figure represents the 
architecture of the Global Information Grid (GIG) for a 
typical lethal targeting function.  Beneath the surface 
complexity of the GIG diagram, lies an even deeper reservoir 
of technical expertise required to make the GIG functional.  
However, this technical expertise requires a great deal of 
individual specialization.  This system requires integrated 
solutions, but there is not one single source solution.  As 
technology increases, the concept of technical complexity 
becomes more pronounced in the wicked problem set framework. 
 
                     
27 E. Jeffrey Conklin, Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared 
Understanding of Wicked Problems (Chester, England: Wiley, 2006). 
28 Conklin.  
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Figure 2.   Targeting Global Information Grid (GIG)29 
In many respects, military professionals have 
historically known and appreciated the concept of wicked 
problems.  From classical to current military theorists and 
practitioners, war’s complexity and ambiguity is well 
documented.  Clausewitzian ideas on the fog of war, 
friction, and uncertainty clearly appreciate the wicked 
problem phenomena.  However, the speed of technology 
combined with the impact of social complexity involved in 
planning, coordination, decision making, assessment, command 
and control makes the wicked problem increasingly more 
relevant and troublesome to military operations.   
                     
29 Department of Defense Global Information Grid Architectural 
Vision, 22 June 2008 <http://www.defenselink.mil/cio 
nii/docs/GIGArchVision.pdf+global+information+grid>. 
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2. Characteristics of Wicked Problems and Social 
Messes 
Based on the literature review of the wicked problem 
set, Conklin’s characteristics best correspond to IO 
targeting.  Conklin characteristics of wicked problems are 
as follows:30 
• The problem is not understood until after 
formulation of a solution.  
• Stakeholders have radically different world 
views and different frames for understanding 
the problem.  
• The problem is never solved.  
• Constraints and resources to solve the 
problem change over time. 
3. Relevancy of Wicked Problems and Social Messes 
with the IO Targeting  
Based upon the definitions and characteristics of 
wicked problems and social messes, a strong correlation 
exists with IO targeting problems.  Since Conklin’s list of 
the characteristics of wicked problems speaks directly to 
the target development and prioritization process. First, in 
terms of social complexity, the sourcing, organization and 
manning of any type of effects cell creates multiple 
stakeholder positions.  These stakeholder positions create 
different views on problem definition and solutions.  
Secondly, technology inherent with IO’s core, supporting and 
related capabilities represents a form of technical 
complexity. Secondly, as it specifically pertains to IO 
                     
30 Conklin.  
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targeting, the conventional linear standpoint of numerically 
ranking targets by a singular value or by their 
accessibility (the low- or high-hanging fruit paradigm) 
creates a false sense of knowledge in tackling the problem.  
The linear ranking assumes a perfect solution.  In wicked 
problems, there is only better or worse based upon one given 
set of problem definition.  So there are multiple sets of 
linear rankings versus an absolute tiered system.  Finally, 
critiques of Effects Based Operations (EBO) regarding its 
utility and viability beyond closed based targeting problems 
support the applicability of the wicked problem set to IO 
targeting.31 For complex environments, the informational and 
cognitive domains, it is prudent to keep the wicked problem 
set in mind to avoid overreaching predictions. While the 
wicked problem set may not be exceptionally new to military 
professionals, awareness of the phenomena promotes greater 
appreciation and understanding of IO targeting complexity. 
J. CRAFTING IO TASK AND EFFECTS STATEMENTS 
1. Current IO Task and Effects Statement Techniques 
Since Joint Publication 3-13 focuses on broad IO 
doctrine, it does not explicitly provide a means to develop 
IO task and purpose statements.  However, the Joint 
Information Operations Planning Course (JIOPC) does put 
forward an interim means of assembling useful IO task and 
effect statements.  IO tasking statements possess a task, 
target and a purpose.  This tasking statement is linked with 
an intended effect.  The effect statement includes the 
                     
31 General J. N. Mattis. “Assessment of Effects based Operations.” 14 
August, 2008. 
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target and its impact on the system.32  By combining tasks 
with their associated effect, this method supports higher 
objectives, allowing for the successful integration of 
multiple IO tasks to support a given effect into the overall 
plan.  The understanding of this technique provides the 
reader with a basic foundation for future comprehension of 
the proposed IO targeting solutions contained in chapter IV 
of the thesis. 
2. Current Doctrine on Crafting Lethal Task and 
Effect Statements 
In 2000, the United States Marine Corps and the United 
States Army doctrinally codified the operational and 
tactical Essential Fire Support Task (EFST) methodology as 
the most efficient and understandable means by which to 
integrate all source fire support through the use of the 
Task, Purpose, Method and Effect, or TPME, format.33  By 
definition, EFSTs prioritize and integrate fires with 
maneuver to achieve an end state.  The task portion puts 
forward a targeting objective against a specific target to 
affect one or all of its functions.  The EFST task statement 
methodology constrains the targeting objective to best 
explain what lethal fires can achieve as a targeting 
objective.  The targeting objectives include Divert, 
                     
32 Joint Force Staff College (U.S.), Information Warfare Division, 
Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook (Norfolk, Va.: Joint 
Forces Staff College, 2008). 
33 During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF 04-06), the author, serving as 
a rifle company commander and the company’s fire support team leader, 
included an attached Tactical Psychological Operations Team (TPT) in the 
company’s fire support plan EFST methodology during two major clearing 
evolutions, Operation MATADOR and SPEAR, thereby treating the TPT as a 
supporting arm on equal footing with Fixed Wing and Rotary Wing Close 
Air Support, armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 81mm mortars and 60mm 
mortars. 
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Destroy, Delay, Disrupt and Limit.  The relatively few 
objectives promote clarity and mutual understanding of what 
fires are trying to accomplish, not how they do it.  The 
EFST purpose statement connects fire with maneuver by 
establishing the rationale for the supporting arms.  The 
EFST method statement coordinates the integration of various 
supporting arms by putting forward a trigger to initiate the 
EFST, a priority of use of the fires, allocation of 
supporting arms and restrictions on their employment.  The 
method paragraph can utilize a narrative format that 
includes the Priority, Allocation, and Restrictions (PAR) 
sub-paragraphs or simply the bulleted PAR acronym.  The 
final EFST statement, effects, puts forward the total effect 
yielded by the contributing assets in the symphony of 
supporting arms integration.34  For example, mortars could 
achieve a suppressive effect on an enemy air defense asset 
in order to allow fixed wing aircraft the ability to destroy 
an enemy tank section that the enemy air defense asset was 
guarding.  In this case, the overall fires effect was one 
air defense asset suppressed for a given period of time and 
the tank section destroyed.  However, the tank section’s 
destruction enabled the supported maneuver element the 
ability to cross a kill zone that the now destroyed enemy 
tank section previously blocked.  EFSTs provide tactical and 
operational leaders the deliberate and hasty ability to 
effectively plan, allocate and coordinate lethal fires using 
an objective based methodology.  However, translating the 
EFST to look at Effects Based Targeting (EBT) has generated 
                     
34 United States Marine Corps, Fire Support Coordination in the 
Ground Combat Element. (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 
2001). 
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some criticism that the EFST methodology is more objective 
based versus effects based.35  Despite the valid counter 
argument for EFST’s suitability for EBT, the EFST framework 
does possess value in that its design simplifies the means 
to express a targeting intent while integrating all fire 
support assets to achieve a higher objective.  As a result, 
priority is placed upon creating better objectives not 
better effects.  
The relevance in understanding the EFST concept for an 
IO targeting thesis is twofold.  First, the recent 
development of the EFST suggests that even at the tactical 
and operational level methodological changes were required 
for successful combined arms integration.  Secondly, the 
method represents a means of conceptual grouping the IO task 
and effect statements to attain better capability 
integration. The understanding of EFSTs enables the reader 
with entry level knowledge to better understand the proposed 
phase two targeting solutions contained in Chapter IV of the 
thesis. 
 
                     
35 Analysis of the Application of an Effects-Based Approach to the 
Conduct of Joint Close Air Support, 2006, Defense Technical Information 
Center. 
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III. UNDERSTANDING AND INDENTIFYING IO TARGET 
DEVELOPMENT AND PRIORITIZATION DIFFICULTIES IN 
PRACTICE 
A. PURPOSE BEHIND UNDERSTANDING IO TARGETING PRACTICE 
In using the collective aspect of effective doctrine, 
the practice of IO targeting should generally align with 
existing published doctrine on IO targeting.  Therefore, 
research data gathered from questionnaires and interviews 
conducted with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) who have 
performed targeting could indicate the strength of 
correlation between actual IO practice and doctrine.  This 
research’s purpose is to gather empirical data from IO 
related SMEs on two subject areas.  First, are IO SMEs using 
the principles and precepts of Joint targeting Doctrine (3-
60) in their target development and prioritization? Second, 
from a general perspective, what sources, techniques and 
procedures are most prevalent?  
B. METHODOLOGY USED IN UNDERSTANDING IO TARGETING 
PRACTICE 
The methodology used was an initial questionnaire sent 
to a pre-identified IO Targeting SME population.  The 
twenty-six respondent member population included all armed 
services, several Department of Defense personnel, and 
echelons of command from the company to the Functional and 
Geographic Combatant Command level.  Respondents were asked 
to answer seven questions on Target Development and 
Prioritization doctrinal sources, references and tools (See 
Appendix). In the second portion of the questionnaire, 
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respondents were asked to evaluate on a scale from one to 
five their IO targeting methodologies, including the 
strength of the principles of the joint targeting process, 
on area of operations specific relevancy, and applicability 
to neutral and adversarial audiences (See Appendix). During 
the final portion of the questionnaire, respondents were 
given the opportunity to provide subjective comments to 
amplify earlier answers or provide general opinions.  Upon 
compiling the data, numbers of answers by category were used 
to present the findings of the questionnaire.  The outputs 
of the compiled data and subjective assessment were used to 
conduct follow-on interviews with selected respondents for 
greater clarity and understanding about IO practice and 
doctrine. 
C. IO TARGETING RESULTS 
1. Respondent Demographics 
A. Service or Department. 
Service Number of Respondents 
Marine Corps 10 
Army 8 
Navy 6 
Department of Defense 2 














Table 2.   Number of respondents by rank 
 
C. Billet.  Due to various self classifications, 
the general category “IO or Effects Cell Staff” was utilized 
to represent the respondent’s billet.   
Billet Number 
IO or Effects Cell Staff 14 
IO Planner 6 
Operations Officer 2 
Intelligence Officer 2 
Company Commander 2 















Naval Flight Officer 4 
Contractor 3 
Intelligence 2 
Information Warfare 2 
Communications 2 
Table 4.   Number of respondents by MOS 
 
E. Area of Operation (AO).36   




                     
36 During the questionnaire process, the author attempted to obtain 
respondents from United States Southern Command.  Unfortunately, 
personnel from United States Southern Command’s J-39 department were 
unable to complete the provided questionnaire but stated that their 
strategic function oriented their IO efforts differently. Specifically, 
United States Southern Command viewed specific targets as in the arena 
of tactical and operational IO.  From the perspective of IO target 
development and prioritization, the United States Southern Command has a 
unique emphasis on strategic communication combined with a comparatively 
more permissive environment and it is unfortunate that their efforts 
could not be included in the results of this study. Additionally, based 
upon organizational and timing issues, United States Africa Command and 
Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa were not included in the 
questionnaire results.  Respondents who provided a sub-region to theatre 




Arabian Gulf 1 
Table 5.   Number of respondents by AO 
 
F. Unit Echelon. 
Echelon Number 
Battalion 7 
Task Force 6 






Table 6.   Number of respondents by unit echelon  
2. Respondent Assessments 
A. Did you use the Joint Publication 3-60 Targeting 
































Yes 3 1 0 1 1 0 
No 17 1 1 0 0 1 
 
Table 7.   Number of respondents by AO who used the JP 3-60 
B. Have you ever read or referenced the JP 3-60 
































Yes 7 1 1 1 1 1 
No 13 1 0 0 0 0 








C. What process did you use to develop and prioritize 
targets?  
Process Number 




Objectives and/or intent into 
Targeting Solutions 
4 
Effects Based Targeting 3 
Nodal Analysis 3 
SOP 1 
Service Planning Process 1 
Civilian Marketing Techniques 1 
Classified 1 
Table 9.   Targeting processes used by respondents 































Yes    15 0 1 1 1 1 
No 5 2 0 0 0 0 
Table 10.    Number of doctrinal based targeting processes 
used by respondents  
 34
E. If the process was informal, please provide a 
brief summary of the process used?  
• Only five respondents answered this question. 
• With one exception, the answers involved an 
informal approval process submitted to a 
commander. 
• The one exception detailed how different 
paths and level of approval were used for 
individual core, supporting and related IO 
capabilities. 
F. Did you use a (any) tools to support your target 
development and prioritization?  
• Only three of the respondents identified 
explicit tools beyond synchronization 
matrices. 
• One of the respondents who answered in the 
affirmative discussed difficulties in making 
the tools “stick”; as a result, the process 
usually reverted back to standard PowerPoint-
style briefings. 
3. Respondent Ratings   
The respondents were asked to rate the strength of 
their target development and prioritization processes on a 
scale of one to five, with one (1) being the lowest and five 
(5) being the highest.  The results were averaged, and are 
presented below. 
• The process was effects based:  3.6  
• The process was interdisciplinary:  3.9  
• The process was focused:    3.6 
• The process was systematic:   3.5 
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• The process was effective:   3.3 
• The process used was consistent:  4.0 
• The process used was a byproduct of my 
theatre of operations:    3.9 
• The process used would be applicable to 
neutral audiences:      3.6 
• The process used would be applicable to 
adversarial audiences:    3.6 
4. Respondent Suggestions   
The following are selected suggestions from the 
respondent group: 
• Utilize civilian marketing techniques for 
target development and prioritization. 
• Employ existing targeting tools such as IOPC-
J and Vision. 
• Expand the 3-60 doctrine to include non-
lethal targeting. 
• Formalize processes to better develop and 
prioritize targets. 
• Increase the speed of the process. 
• Better integrate IO into existing processes 
versus being an afterthought. 
• Adopt AJP 3.0 NATO Information Operations 
Doctrine because it is a superior doctrinal 
source.37 
                     
37 The author researched IO doctrine from NATO, the United Kingdom 
and Canada as part of the literature review for this thesis.  Beyond 
several instances of exceptionally informative ideas on unique 
perspectives, subtle nuances and the clearer linkage of IO with the 
instruments of national power, the author did not find any distinct 
examples on targeting as it would directly apply to this thesis.   
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5. Conclusions 
Based upon the biographical data and quality of the 
answers, the respondents possessed vast IO experience 
amongst a joint, diverse and multi-faceted population.  
However, while the principles of joint targeting doctrine 
are being applied, limited collective doctrine, procedures 
or techniques are being used in the practice of IO target 
development and prioritization.  During the interview 
process, several explicit friction points were identified.  
First, personality and perception of non-lethal effects cell 
or targeting board participants in the targeting process 
inhibited integration and target development and 
prioritization.  Second, the lack of a distinct methodology 
beneath the phase level of the Joint Targeting Cycle 
produced individually unique solution methodologies.  
Thirdly, especially in Iraq, the data suggests a gap between 
joint doctrine and practice; even though, the Iraq data 
derives from primarily from respondents performing IO 
targeting functions, but not serving in an explicit IO 
targeting billet at lower echelons of command, the  Finally, 
the paradigm of segregating targets as lethal or non-lethal 
visibly marginalizes integration. However, despite the 
described problems, the respondent’s ratings consistently 
leaned towards high strength in evaluation of their own 
individual processes.  Therefore, the problem with IO target 
development and prioritization lies in the realm of 
developing a workable methodology within the existing Joint 
Targeting Cycle to enhance phase two, target development and 
prioritization.  
 37
 From a problem identification position, this study’s 
research has identified joint IO and targeting doctrinal 
inconsistencies, connected attributes of wicked problem set 
to highlight the difficulties with developing and 
prioritizing targets, and captured empirical data that 
suggesting that if the existing doctrine is even used or 
referenced, no distinct methodology surfaces.  As a result, 
an IO target development and prioritization deficiency 
exists with the existing practice, doctrine and supporting 
technology.  Next, the thesis will put forward five 
recommendations involving practical, methodological and 
technological solutions to aid in the improvement of the IO 
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IV. IO TARGET DEVELOPMENT AND PRIORITIZATION 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTERIM IO JMEM TECHNIQUES 
The purpose of interim IO JMEM techniques is to enhance 
phase six (assessment) of the Joint Targeting Cycle due to 
its correlation to phase two (target development and 
prioritization). Since IO target development and 
prioritization requires some ability to forecast effects, 
the stated lack of a complete IO JMEM impedes this process.  
To address, but not solve, the vital IO JMEM question, three 
analogous case examples: parole boards, predictive markets, 
and jury consultation are presented as interim 
methodological ideas for an IO JMEM equivalent.   The use of 
these recommended interim techniques improves the ability to 
develop and then prioritize targets.          
1. Parole Boards 
The general concept of parole boards represents a close 
comparison to an IO JMEM.  Parole is defined as a period of 
conditional community supervision following a prison term.  
If one views the incarceration process as rehabilitation 
instead of pure punishment, the success of a parole board 
recommendation aligns well with IO effects prediction, 
especially target development. Conceding the difficulties 
associated with a narrow criminal target audience, the act 
of discretionary parole board release is very similar to 
building target folders that possess physical, information 
and cognitive attributes. 
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Department of Justice (DOJ) statistics indicate that 
parole boards have a low rate of success in predicting 
recidivism. The parole population is primarily split between 
mandatory and discretionary release cases.  As of 2004, 
mandatory releases comprised 52% of the parole population. 
Discretionary releases, this study’s focal point of 
interest, comprised 31% of the parole population.38  From 
1995 to 2004, only 46% of the parole population actually 
completed their assigned release programs.  Of those who 
failed, nearly 39% returned to incarceration.  Surprisingly, 
discretionary parolees only achieved a 5% better performance 
over mandatory release parolees in re-arrest rates.39   
The difficulty of behavioral prediction for all 
categories of parole presents an interesting study.  
Criminal psychologists and correctional experts seek to 
successfully identify key predictive factors in order to 
improve discretionary parole decisions.  A recent study of 
statistically large parole groups for prediction of violent 
recidivism provides greater insight in the difficulty of 
cognitive predictability.  The large group of violent 
offenders consisted of generalized aggressors, family only 
aggressors, and non-family only aggressors.  The study 
further subdivided the three groups by coding criminals by 
eight concrete “predictability factors.”  Predictability 
factors included, among others, demographics, prior criminal 
history, substance abuse history and coded dynamic 
                     
38 Lauren E. Glaze, Seri Palla, and United States Bureau of Justice 
Statistics., Probation and Parole in the United States, 2004 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2005). 
39 The Urban Institute, Study Finds Parole Has Little Effect on 
Rearrest Rates (Washington,DC: The Urban Institute, 2005). 
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predictors.  By applying a univariate optimal discriminate 
analysis to develop a measurable test statistic, the study 
reached conclusions about the strength of predictability for 
violent recidivism.  The test statistic, labeled Effect 
Strength of Sensitivity (ESS), ranged from 0 to 100.  
Attaining no improvement in predictability achieved a 0, 
while achieving absolute predictability would score a 100.  
ESS rated at 50 or higher indicates strong predictability. 
Despite the high trend of national recidivism rates, no 
single predictability factor achieved an ESS greater than 
20. By statistically aggregating individuals based on 
multiple predictability factors, an ESS of 50 could be 
attained for the generalized aggressor group.40  Despite 
concrete procedures, statistical rigor and application of 
professional art, the study achieved mixed results even in 
predicting behavior in the case of violent recidivism.  From 
an IO targeting perspective, the ability to determine an 
exact probability of influence is extremely low, but could 
be slightly effective.   
As a result, this technique possesses three 
implications for IO target development.  First, if a parole 
board, who possesses the freedom to collect predictability 
factors and interview its targets, lacks the ability to 
accurately predict behavior then how well can an IO 
targeting cell perform?  This observation supports that 
behavior prediction represents a complex versus closed 
system.  As a result, a possibility exists in over 
                     
40 L.J. Stalans, et al., "Identifying Three types of Violent 
Offenders and Predicting Violent Recidivism while on Probation: A 
Classification Tree Analysis." Law and Human Behavior 28.3 (2004): 253-
71. 
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estimation in the target development process.41  Secondly, 
the inclusion of predictability factors can be used as data 
entries during a target’s development as a feasible means of 
ensuring the target’s physical domain is connected to its 
informational and cognitive attributes.  Finally, the 
strength of the developed target based upon number and 
significance of predictability factors serves a crucial 
factor in its eventual prioritization.  Though mostly 
applicable to target development, the parole board technique 
greatly assists the vetting and validation of targets 
across all domains. 
2. Predictive Markets 
Once a target has been nominated and approved for 
action, it has to be prioritized.  Applying this study’s 
understanding of the wicked problem set, it is assumed that 
this priority is not an absolute ranking.  Instead, the 
priority represents a relative standing based on 
objectives, stakeholder position and changes in the 
operational environment.  The priority is dynamic, not 
static.  However, at some point in time in the operational 
environment, a target needs a priority because one will 
never have unlimited time, assets, and resources.  The 
predictive market technique enables developed targets to be 
prioritized in both a timely, responsive and effective 
manner to complete phase two prioritization. 
                     
41 General J. N. Mattis. “Assessment of Effects based Operations.” 14 
August 2008. 
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The ability to aggregate the collective intelligence of 
groups serves as an excellent method to predict outcomes.42  
Field experiments have demonstrated that the predictions 
made by statistically large groups and expressed in a market 
format tend to outperform those of the experts in horse 
betting, political campaigns and actual stock markets.43  
This concept is not a fluke: the average guess of a 
statistically large population regarding the number of 
jellybeans in a jar will generally be within 3% of the 
actual count and will most likely outperform the best 
individual guess.44  Many large and successful corporations 
such as Google use internal predictive markets as 
forecasting tools.45  The website Hollywood Stock Exchange 
(www.hsx.com) utilizes a rule-based protocol to convert 
movie and celebrity box office results into a fictional 
Hollywood dollar stock value.  Based upon their overall 
portfolio performance, online investors possess the ability 
to exercise full trading options on either a pure 
entertainment or competitive basis.  While this is not a 
pure predictive market, a high correlation exists between 
the Hollywood Stock Exchange stock price prior to a movie’s 
opening day and the actual box office results.   
                     
42 James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many are Smarter 
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Predictive markets should not be confused with the act 
of consensus building.  Instead, predictive markets are 
dynamic processes that express the likelihood of an event 
occurring through the value of market shares.  Nor should 
predictive markets be confused with traditional intelligence 
functions. The vital aspect of intelligence involves the 
dissemination of an assessment in order to permit friendly 
utilization.  Therefore, many good intelligence predictions 
do not evolve into fulfillment because a friendly action 
prevents the analysis from reaching fruition.  Unless a 
commander chooses to employ an ambush-type tactic, many good 
intelligence assessments never come to pass.  Despite its 
potential, the government’s proposed utilization of the 
failed 2001 DARPA terrorist predictive market results would 
not yield pure results because speculators would hedge bets 
knowing the government could not ignore a high probability 
terrorist event.46   In a purely interactive market, traders 
would treat events as independent entities.  However, if the 
agency hosting the market makes decisions predicated on the 
market developments, that independence is lost, since 
traders will base their actions on a combination of the 
probability of an event occurring and the probability of the 
market host taking preventative action. Therefore, the 
possibility of host intervention could make a military 
predictive market ineffective unless measures are taken to 
retain event independence. 
Although many commercial software solutions exist to 
implement predictive markets, a simplistic IO JMEM 
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predictive market could be established inside a targeting 
board.  One could use a confidence vote system per event or 
create an internal competitive market system comparable to 
well known Fantasy Football Leagues.    The strength of a 
developed target’s prioritization for a given targeting 
objective or plan suggests a direct correlation with its 
priority.  A predictive market or some equivalent system 
could harness the experience, skill and wisdom of 
professionals as corollary means to prioritize targets. 
3. Jury Consultation 
Jury consultants are cognitive and legal experts tasked 
with the study of juries, legal opponent strategy and 
witness testimony to produce the most favorable outcomes for 
their clients.47   Jury selection serves as a hybrid method 
to support both an interim target development and 
prioritization technique.  The use of Jury consultation 
speeds the phase two process by not wasting time developing 
targets that will eventually lack a high priority. 
Consequently, the process yields both High Payoff Targets 
(HPTs) and High Value Targets (HVT) simultaneously.  In 
summary, the process simultaneously relates development with 
prioritization to identify HVTS and HPTs for further 
vetting, validation, approval and prioritization for a given 
course of action. 
DECISIONQUEST, an industry-leading jury consultant 
company, ethically claims to make the best case possible for 
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their client.48 While similar to traditional marketing, jury 
consultation aligns with IO because consultants must remain 
highly cognizant of their message effects to neutral and 
hostile audiences.  From an effects perspective, jury 
consultants primarily possess two strategies to support 
their clients.  During the Voir Dire or jury selection 
process, consultants attempt to stack perspective juries to 
their client’s advantage.49  During the trial, consultants 
attempt to analyze individual jurors’ cognitive profiles and 
the jury’s inter- and intra-relationships in hopes of 
building the best case via the most appropriate medium, 
approach and testimony.  From the comprehensive analysis, 
consultants build mock juries to model, test and validate 
viable trial courses of action.50 In most cases, the 
consultants attempt to sway rather than decisively win whole 
juries.  In some instances, consultants are fully aware that 
they will lose the case, but attempt to reduce the sentence 
or financial penalty. Great difficulty exists in evaluating 
jury consultation effectiveness due to unknown speculation 
on how a case might have ended if a consultant had not been 
used.  As a matter of self-interested practice, the industry 
maintains an unassuming profile due to the very real 
possibility that its services provide an unfair legal 
advantage.51  At the same time, the industry’s growth and 
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prominence provides a measure of merit.52  Even though jury 
consultants operate in a controlled environment, their job 
is not trivial.   Beyond the courtroom, successful companies 
like DECISIONQUEST incorporate parallel activities such as 
strategic communications to win the case in the media 
before, during and after the case.  Finally, DECISIONQUEST 
conducts a post-trial analysis, a process similar to the 
targeting step of combat assessment, to ascertain detailed 
insights for future application. This comprehensive approach 
allows DECISIONQUEST to apply gained experience in future 
cases.   
The mock jury approach combined with full trial 
supporting activities provides a relevant solution to target 
development and prioritization processes.  Therefore, this 
technique puts forward a best practice means of de-selecting 
identified targets as candidates for vetting.  This paradigm 
shift improves development and subsequent speed, relevance 
and efficiency. 
B. ADOPTION OF THE MEASURE OF WORTH (MOW) MODEL 
What gets measured gets attention. 
-R. G. Eccles 
Assessment of measured success serves as a vital 
component of IO target development and prioritization.  
Present conventional wisdom suggests the greatest challenge 
to measuring success involves proper and complete 
information collection followed by intelligence analysis.  
However, the adoption of Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) as 
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the means to track true progress exists as the largest 
obstacle to effective IO assessment.  In turn, based upon 
the stated link between phase six and two, targets 
subsequently cannot be fully developed and prioritized. 
MOEs, by definition, fundamentally cause assessment 
confirmation bias in IO regardless of the quality of 
collections and intelligence.  Even worse, MOEs fail 
disastrously in the cognitive domain.  The stated failure in 
proper analytical process causes IO practitioners to seek 
out supportive indicators while possibly avoiding or missing 
negative signs.    To prevent inherent bias, IO requires an 
approach to account for success, failure and the unknown.  
The implementation of the proposed Measure of Worth (MOW) 
model would greatly increase the quality of assessment and 
target development and prioritization. . 
In combat, regardless of the domain, one is fighting an 
active, determined and clever opponent.  War by nature is 
complex, not simple.   Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) is 
defined as a way to “determine whether IO actions being 
executed are having the desired effect toward mission 
accomplishment: the attainment of end states and 
objectives.”53 In both definition and practice, MOEs only 
capture success oriented indicators.  Collection management 
that is focused only on achievement may entirely miss 
indicators of failure.  Moving away from the familiarity of 
the term, the singular perspective might not provide an 
accurate assessment of the true situation.  For example, the 
memory of the statue of Saddam Hussein being toppled in 
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Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom I suggested a massive 
upwelling of popular support for coalition forces.  However, 
the two photos shown below demonstrate how seeking the 
positive can truly bias an assessment.  The near Baghdad 
picture (Figure 3) suggests a measure of effectiveness: 
masses celebrating the demise of Saddam’s regime.  The far 
Baghdad picture (Figure 4) illustrates that the masses were 
limited and isolated.  Due to the scene’s promise, the magic 
of the moment and the admiration of U.S. service members, 
the event was only measured from a positive perspective. A 
better concept is definitely required. 
 
 
Figure 3.    Baghdad Near Picture (www.google.com) 
 50
 
Figure 4.    Baghdad Far Picture (www.google.com) 
Reason and free inquiry are the only effectual 
agents against error. 
-Thomas Jefferson 
The proposed worth model facilitates free inquiry by 
approaching the IO assessment and target development and 
prioritization problem from a complete perspective.  The 
model involves three sequential reduction components: 
filters, bins and qualifiers.  First, filters collect 
possible indicators that can become Measures of Worth (MOW).  
MOWs would be defined as indicators that could possibly 
provide value in assessing an effect.  Using the MOW 
convention, analysts would lean towards data inclusion even 
if it lacks completeness.  Next, MOWs are processed into 
bins based upon their classification.  The bins are 
segmented as follows: 
 51
• Positive Indicator (PI). Indicates that the 
associated MOW confirms success towards the stated 
objective or effect.   
• Unknown Indicator (UI).   Despite possessing 
ambiguous qualities, the MOW requires further 
analysis and development.  
• Negative Indicator (NI).  Identifies that the 
associated MOW confirms failure towards the stated 
effect.   
 
 
Figure 5.   Measure of Worth (MOW) Model 
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Qualifiers provide amplification to the grouped 
measures.  The aim of qualifiers is to facilitate judgment 
through the employment of operational art versus absolute 
statistical inferences.  This aim implies that one NI may 
outweigh several PIs or vice versa depending on content; 
either way, judgment is critical.  Four primary qualifiers 
have been created to support weighting various measures: 
• Confidence of Assessment.  The use of high, 
medium, and low expresses the strength of a given 
measure.  The colored “gumball” model promotes 
quick and efficient understanding. 
• Classification of Measure Type.  Qualitative and 
quantitative are self explanatory, but 
conventional wisdom relays a measure from a 
popular perspective.  Finally, anecdotal measures 
convey the human experience through story. 
• Time Currency.  A decay time is associated with 
any measure, so measures must explicitly state 
their latest update time. 
• Outliers.  Designates sensational events that are 
anomalies.  Although an event may qualify as a 
statistical outlier, one should remember that it 
is sometimes the sensational event that captures 
the imagination of the influence audience.   
The adoption of the MOW model represents an analytical 
and briefing change versus a real operational change.  
Analogous to a hockey player’s plus-minus rating, the MOW 
model allows commanders to grasp the true picture of IO 
effectiveness.  In hockey, the plus/minus rating of a player 
is determined by measuring the number of goals scored versus 
the number of goals scored by opponents while that player is 
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on the ice.54  Applying war theory, one understands that 
many indicators require development either through time or 
analytical rigor to comprehend effects.  Transition from the 
MOE to MOW doctrine would greatly enhance the ability to 
conduct IO targeting because it strengthens the link between 
phase two target development and prioritization and 
assessment. 
C. THE HOLISTIC TARGET (HOT) DEVELOPMENT AND 
PRIORITIZATION MODEL 
It suddenly dawned on me that most people running 
from the law don’t eat out.  They order pizza.  
-Cynthia Brown, of the Butler County Child 
Enforcement Agency in Ohio, on her inspiration to 
place wanted posters of child-support scofflaws 
on local pizza boxes in an effort to turn up the 
heat on deadbeat dads and moms. 
The clever idea of targeting deadbeat dads and moms 
through pizza boxes best represents the concept of the HOT 
target development and prioritization model because it would 
not be immediately apparent that pizza boxes related to 
deadbeat parents (See Figure 6). 
                     












“This is how your 
effect can’t happen!”
Crystal Ball
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Figure 6.   HOT Target Development and Prioritization Model 
 
However, after reading the scenario of how to address dead 
beat parents, the idea makes perfect sense. Deadbeat parents 
on the run would tend to order out for delivery pizza.  By 
placing a wanted poster on a pizza delivery box, a message 
is literally being delivered to dead beat parents and the 
person delivering the pizza.  Therefore, the information 
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either supports the capture of the target or influences the 
target to turn themselves over to a local law enforcement 
agency. From this example, HOT represents a full option 
analytical framework that effectively decomposes targeting 
problems, and then externalizes targeting solutions.55  Most 
importantly, the model incorporates cognitive heuristics to 
promote good decision-making and intervene in the case of 
bad practice.   
The HOT model does not follow any explicit steps, 
procedures or cycles, but anchors itself to the second phase 
of the Joint Targeting Cycle: target development and 
prioritization.56 Complex IO problems rarely find solutions 
in linear thinking.  Instead, the model connects 
conventional thinking and dynamic relationships with 
decision-making heuristics to form the central guiding 
principle in developing and prioritizing a targeting 
solution.  The heuristics rely more on military art and 
experience than on strict scientific adherence to the 
absolute fundamentals of targeting, systems engineering, 
psychology or behavioral science. In order to explain the 
model, groups are presented by their structure, purpose and 
relationship.     
Defining the system determines the scope and 
perspective of the problem.  Systems can be viewed as 
                     
55 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 1999. 
56 Joint PSYOPs Publication 3-53: Psychological Operations suggests 
using the Joint Targeting Cycle to demonstrate PSYOPs targeting.  Joint 
Publication 3-60: Targeting suggests using the Joint Cycle as the 
method.  Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations stresses 
coordination. JFCs must ensure that IO planners are fully integrated 
into the planning and targeting process, assigning them to the joint 
targeting coordination board in order to ensure full integration with 
all other planning and execution efforts. 
 56
networks of many variables in causal relationships with one 
another.  Systems are nearly always dynamic in nature.  The 
governing rule in successful system definition fits the 
“Goldilocks” principle of finding a scope that is just 
right.   
The Initial Desired Result (IDR) represents the raw 
desired targeting effect derived from the commander’s higher 
objective.  The utility of the IDR concept predicates itself 
upon the research finding that early rigid problem 
definition in a process diminishes the possibility of future 
alternate solutions.57 In addition to stating the initial 
targeting IO effect, the IDR should capture assumptions, 
constraints, purpose, objective, unwanted outcomes and 
critical decisions as a reference point for future 
benefit.58 The IDR must retain flexibility to prevent the 
group tendency of anchoring future discussion in order to 
unwisely ensure the IDR remains the ultimate effect.59  From 
a process perspective, the use of the IDR serves as the 
figurative starting point to measure, for better or worse, 
how far the solution has progressed or possibly drifted. 
Applying analytical rigor beyond conventional target 
development, HOT employs four cognitive heuristic lenses - 
the Devil’s Advocate, the Weak Actor, Crystal Ball, and Ball 
and Chain - combining analysis, synthesis and intuition to 
ultimately express targeting solutions in a timely manner.  
                     
57 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005) 
206. 
58 Gary A. Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998) 330. 
59 Klein, 330. 
 57
Creative insight is defined as the ability to take existing 
pieces of information and combine them in novel ways that 
lead to greater understanding.   Interestingly, the concept 
of creative insight surfaces in the writing of some renowned 
military theorists.  Clausewitz suggested the Coup d’ Oeil, 
or stroke of the eye, as one means of making decisions in 
the face of uncertainty. Coup d’ Oeil is the rapid discovery 
of truth which is either not visible to the ordinary mind at 
all or only becomes so after a long examination and 
reflection.60  In the modern era, Boyd’s description of 
constructive and deconstructive forces in the Orient phase 
of his Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop parallels the 
concept of creative insight. The model requires the target 
to be efficiently developed from different positions in 
order to generate sufficient military genius to solve the 
problem in a timely manner. Milton Friedman stated, 
”Assumptions do not have to have anything to do with reality 
as long as they work.”  The adoption of prescriptive 
assumptions about how to solve the IDR facilitates a 
holistic approach to better align doctrine with practice. 
Targeting options are evaluated on their individual merit as 
opposed to a comparative basis in order to encourage 
multiple perspectives and, perhaps, solutions. In support of 
the prescriptive positions, a brainstorming process serves 
as the favored method to generate a large quantity of ideas, 
create an information-sharing atmosphere and deter group 
think.    
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In some cases, decision-making weakened by uncertainty 
produces a mindset that is not sufficiently grounded, but 
that, in the short term, favors an already established 
belief or decision structure.  While useful under certain 
circumstances, the described influence of transformation, or 
wishful thinking, could produce expectations inconsistent 
with achievable results.61  The Devil’s Advocate position 
utilizes a “pre-mortem” strategy to visualize ways the IDR 
can not reach attainment.62  Two important results are 
captured from this position.  First, the Devil’s Advocate 
position determines IDR feasibility and scope.  Second, from 
a “red hat”, or hostile force perspective, the Devil’s 
Advocate position generates an event template to forecast 
dynamic enemy, neutral audience and environment changes to 
balance expectations.  This can include enumerating effects 
that the planners do wish to see come to fruition.  The use 
of the Devil’s Advocate heuristic marginalizes influences of 
transformation upon the targeting process. 
Many decisions suffer from an “illusion of control” due 
to an overestimation of individual impact on a system’s 
ultimate outcome.63  The Weak Actor position envisions 
alternate actors, actions and events that might achieve the 
IDR.  The imaginary restraint of power adopted in the Weak 
Actor position creates the paradigm of a desperate mindset.  
Desperate thinking trumps typical risk adverse mentalities 
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and the intoxication of power to produce unconventional 
solutions.  For example, as part of typical target 
development, a commander’s objective may not be synchronized 
with the target audience, which could ultimately diminish 
the feasibility of achieving the necessary effects.  
Instead, the Weak Actor position may suggest pre-planned, 
on-call IO targeting options predicated on the 
materialization of favorable condition necessary to make the 
effect feasible.  For example, a general anti-insurgent 
effect may only work if it occurs when the insurgent group 
commits a mass atrocity versus if it were introduced 
randomly. The position requires extreme tactical patience 
because the Weak Actor position may not fit with a pre-
planned timetable. 
A negative logic approach provides a means of reaching 
decisions by effectively eliminating non-feasible 
approaches.  This cognitive process, called inferences of 
impossibility, allows economy of decision making because it 
is easier to disprove than prove an option.64  The saying, 
”Because that’s the way it has always been done” expresses 
the concept to a partial extent.  Obviously, planners must 
avoid re-inventing the wheel while actively seeking 
insightful leverage points to solve previously unsolvable 
problems. The Crystal Ball position theorizes possible ways 
to solve a problem without imposing any constraints. Options 
previously viewed as being “off the table” are now adopted 
for analysis.  The Crystal Ball metaphor enables planners to 
bypass real and artificial constraints to produces new 
solutions.        
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The Ball and Chain metaphor examines known and possible 
relationships between the IDR and other nodes.   Nodes 
related to the IDR combined with qualitative analysis 
provide mental simulation to forecast intentional and 
unintentional nth order effects.    Graphic visualization 
uses the spatial positioning of nodes, characteristics of 
nodes such as color, shape, and size, and characteristics of 
edges such as texture and color to communicate as much 
information as possible within a single graph. Commercially 
available social network analysis tools like Palantir, 
UCINET, Netminer3, Pajek and Krackplot provide a relatively 
easy means to graphically convey complex relationships.65 
Much like an iceberg, the Ball and Chain position shows what 
is lurking beneath the surface from a relationship 
perspective. 
The use of four heuristic lenses along with 
conventional target development many not appeal to targeting 
experts, experienced analysts and talented decision-makers.  
However, research demonstrates that only experienced 
professionals perform just as well using an intuitive based 
decision-making model.66 So how could experience possibly 
hurt? Consider the following example of how talented, 
experienced and intelligent individuals make mistakes. 
Skilled chess players possess the ability to reconstruct a 
piece position in near perfect form after only a brief 
exposure due to the game’s pattern analysis.  In a study, 
chess grandmasters possessed the ability to recall the exact 
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position of every piece on the board: the average 
participant could only remember six pieces.   However, both 
the average participant and grandmaster scored equally if 
the disposition of the same number of pieces was completely 
random.67  Grandmasters lost their edge because their pattern 
analysis abilities were marginalized through the very 
randomness of the pieces.  In short, one remains an expert 
only as long as one is playing one’s own game and is playing 
under the game’s assumed rules.  Even though the board 
looked like chess, it was not, so it was an equal playing 
field for both grandmaster and average-Joe alike.  Even 
worse, when experts fail, the results can be catastrophic 
due to the obvious fidelity placed on their decision-making 
stature.  The HOT model advocates the use of cognitive 
heuristics to prevent common decision-making mistakes for 
beginners and experts alike. 
The process of applying analytical rigor to the IDR 
through the stated heuristic lenses provides planners the 
situational awareness, knowledge and perspective to arrive 
at a Revised Direct Effect (RDE). If the strength of the RDE 
is not sufficient, it can be reprocessed as an IDR or war-
gamed to provide viability.  A “Priori” effect theorizes 
ways an RDE (now treated as a first order intentional 
effect) would be better targeted as an nth ordered 
intentional or unintentional effect.  For example, the 
initial desired effect may have been to capture the number 
one ranked High Value Target (HVT#1) at a vulnerable time 
and location.  From the Crystal Ball position, it was 
                     
67 Adriaan D. de Groot, Fernand Gobet, and Neil Charness, "Perception 
and Memory in Chess: Studies in the Heuristics of the Professional Eye," 
Contemporary Psychology. 43.6 (1998): 416. 
 62
determined that HVT#1 would be most vulnerable while 
visiting a relative’s house because he would feel most 
comfortable and would therefore reduce his security 
entourage.  Unfortunately, insufficient intelligence exists 
to know his actual pattern of visits.  Additionally, the 
amount of time, effort and exposure required to collect and 
analyze the HVT’s visits to relatives may compromise the 
targeting strategy.  However, the Ball and Chain position 
identified a series of key individual and trigger nodes that 
could force HVT#1’s displacement.  The original first order 
objective has evolved into a planned, intentional, nth order 
effect shaped by the Priori effects by using Military 
Deception ruse against the network in such a way to make the 
target move.  In this case, Military Deception could be used 
to force the target to squirt or move, thereby setting the 
conditions for the physical capture.  The MILDEC now 
achieves the 1st order effect of making the target squirt 
that enables the 2nd order effect of the HVI’s capture.  
Priori effects create a phased targeting plan to generate 
targeting solutions favorable to meeting the RDE. 
“Lateral” effects are designed as, but not limited to, 
means of synchronizing lethal and non-lethal effects.  
Additionally, they may enable integrated application of IO 
capabilities.  A sniper shot that kills an insurgent placing 
an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) produces both a clear 
physical and psychological effect.  The sniper kill could be 
considered a planned lateral effect that triggers subsequent 
follow on psychological operations.  Doctrinally, it is 
understood that random psychological effects due to the 
nature of war do not automatically constitute psychological 
operations.  However, the morale aspect of war plays a 
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significant role regardless of strict definition. As a 
result, Physical Attack (PA) served as the “trigger” for 
pre-planned IO targeting. Lateral effects serve as viable 
mechanisms to create opportunities for complementary and 
synergetic lethal and non-lethal solutions. 
The most central piece of the HOT model involves the 
internal interaction to the planning cell to achieve 
solutions.  Difficulties in interaction could force an open-
ended approach or an iterative process solution.  
Regardless, the end state is not only a solution, but also a 
larger understanding of the targeting problem.  The holistic 
model provides a solution to effective targeting that 
integrates all elements of national power from the strategic 
to the tactical levels of war to develop and prioritize 
targets. 
D. CRAFTING OBJECTIVES USING COMPENDIUM SOFTWARE 
Doctrinally, the start of phase two target development 
and prioritization begins with target identification.  For 
IO targeting, this identification occurs across the 
physical, informational and cognitive domains.  In the HOT 
method of target development and prioritization, IDR 
represents the convergence of phase one objectives and the 
phase two target identification.  Applying an understanding 
of wicked problems68 as the concept relates to problem 
definition along with the joint targeting doctrine and the 
HOT methodology, the compendium program serves as a 
technological means to effectively set in motion phase two 
actions. In summary, compendium serves as the vital hinge 
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between phases one and two of the targeting cycle to 
facilitate correlation between objectives and identified 
targets employing the HOT methodology. 
As a means to better understanding problem definition, 
Jeff Conklin introduced the concept of “Dialogue Mapping” as 
the method to facilitate shared understanding by the 
visualization of initial solutions.  Conklin’s dialogue 
mapping employs an argumentation design called the Issue 
Based Information Scheme (IBIS) to produce a framework for 
this problem understanding.69  In implementation, a freeware 
program entitled Compendium provides the software means to 
efficiently perform dialogue mapping in an effect or 
targeting cell environment.70  The Compendium freeware 
solution delivers an efficient means to define the system, 
establish the Initial Desired Result (IDR) and achieve IO 
participant targeting problem understanding. 
The argumentation scheme used by Compendium employs a 
basic scheme of icons to illustrate and, therefore, map the 
given problem’s complexity (See Figure 7).  The software’s 
Windows-based design and intuitive format allows an operator 
to instantly understand and make use of Compendium.  
Compendium’s IBIS starts with a simple question or idea.  
Starting with the question or idea, the operator can link 
other associated icons to produce the IBIS framework.  
Through the process of dragging icon nodes and relationship 
connector lines, along with succinctly capturing text notes 
on each node, a better understanding of the issue begins to 
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emerge.  As the problem receives further scrutiny, selected 
icons reveal hidden problem complexities that provide 
further understanding.  The process continues until the 
participant group decides that it has sufficiently framed 
the issue to enable subsequent refinement in the problem 
solving process. 
 
Figure 7.    Compendium Icon Scheme71 
 
In Figure 8, a basic IBIS scheme was created to 
illustrate Compendium.  First, a dilemma was introduced by 
placing the idea icon node on the “drawing board” 
represented by the program’s work area.  Next, a “Pro” icon 
node and a “Con” icon node were connected to the original 
question.  In each node, an infinite number of text details 
can be recorded using a note card type electronic entry 
format.  The details are organized by individual node with 
an associated time and date for each respective entry.  
Compendium operators can now record different perspectives 
on the same problem over time, different viewpoints held by 
previous staff in the case of a turnover or Relief in Place 
(RIP), or note possible internal dissenting opinions.  
Various other icons exist such as the argument, decision, 
reference, and note icons for greater precision in the IBIS 
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picture.  Additionally, the map node (See Figure 9) can nest 
an entire IBIS scheme inside the icon to capture complex 
subordinate problems that can be accessed if desired, but 
that are not necessary for the larger picture.  Though  
seemingly elementary, the IBIS process illuminates a complex 
process in order to gain an understanding of problem 
definition. 
 
Figure 8.   Basic IBIS Compendium Scheme72 
 
Figure 9.   Map Node Icon for nesting IBIS Compendium 
Schemes73 
 
From the HOT target development and prioritization 
model perpsective, Compendium becomes an extellent tool for 
system definition and crafting an IDR.  To illustrate this 
point, this thesis used an historic best practice Counter 
Insurgency Operations (COIN) principle with Compedium to 
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build an IDR (See Figure 10).  First, the fictional 
effects/targeting cell started with a proven COIN objective, 
in this case an IDR, of isolating insurgents from their 
cause and support.  While not an informationally pure IDR, 
the very COIN practical IDR represents a classic hybrid 
lethal and non-lethal targeting objective.  Stemming from 
the IDR, five questions were asked and connected to the IDR.  
Additionally, a “Con” argument was connected to the IDR 
because one fictional participant believed that the word 
“cause” was too vague.  Extending from the subsequent 
questions, argument and decision icons were used to classify 
support, using a COIN perspective, as internal support and 
external support.  Along with the first series of questions 
related to the IDR, a reference node icon was used to put 
forward the idea as to whether Mao’s popular war insurgency 
theory is relative to this case.  This reference node can 
have a file imbedded inside it or contain a hyperlink for 
external reference.  As Compendium’s IBIS scheme is extended 
to the right, more relationship nodes are connected by the 
cell to visually identify inter- and intra-relationships.  
For the sake of brevity in the example, the 
effects/targeting cell put forward a more detailed IDR based 
on problem understanding by devising a theme of 





Figure 10.   COIN IDR Example 
 
While Compendium, as with most programs, is as only as 
good as the operator, it does provide a doctrinal, 
methodological and technological means to identify targets.  
Doctrinally, compendium effectively connects phase one 
objectives with relevant phase two targets.  
Methodologically, Compendium facilitates the HOT’s 
formulation of the IDR and size of the system.  Though not 
technologically sophisticated, Compendium’s construct, 
functionality and, ultimately, its simplicity serves as a 
means to better develop and prioritize targets.  All 
together, Compendium represents a freeware solution to 
improve the phase two actions while adding greater 
feasibility to the initial steps of the HOT methodology. 
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E. HOT TARGET PRIORITIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT USING 
PALANTIR SOFTWARE 
1. What is Palantir? 
Palantir’s enterprise software architecture provides an 
open platform that enables an unprecedented degree of 
collaboration among information analysts across 
organizational and geographical boundaries. Palantir’s 
workspace is the visually intuitive front end of the 
platform, and provides an integrated suite of tools and 
technologies used in Palantir Investigations by analysts to 
gather, analyze, augment, and publish vast amounts of 
information.74  Although primarily an intelligence analyst’s 
tool, Palantir’s relationship analysis aligns well with the 
HOT methodology for target development and prioritization.  
2. Palantir’s Relevance to Phase Two Target 
Development and Prioritization 
As a recommendation, Palantir represents the keystone 
of the four other suggested improvements.  Since software 
programs are only as good as the operator, the previous four 
steps exist as means to fashion superior inputs into 
Palantir.  As a result, Palantir serves as the definitive 
enabler of the previous solutions because it possesses the 
ability to automate the study’s recommendations.  First, the 
outputs from recommended interim JMEM techniques could be 
used as operator inputs inside Palantir.  Second, Measures 
of Worth (MOW) along with its associated Positive, Unknown 
and Negative Indicators (PI, UI,and NI) can be collected, 
                     
74 Palantir Technologies : Products, 15 July 2008 
<http://www.palantirtech.com/products.html>. 
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analyzed, processed and linked inside Palantir.  
Methodologically, Palantir’s flexibility enables the fast 
and easy implementation of the HOT methodology.  Next, 
though not compatible from a systems definition, Compendium 
outputs can be saved inside Palantir’s database, object view 
or graph view as a support reference.  Since Palantir, 
analyzes not creates, Compendium’s analytical framework 
provides for better inputs into the Palantir database.  
Finally, the grouping of IO assets with its intended target 
and effects moves towards the creation of an EFST.  
Panatir’s supportability of creating EFSTs facilitates the 
integrated employment of IO’s core, related and supporting 
capabilities. The use of Palantir as a target development 
and priority tool combines its own capability with the 
identified best practice outputs of this study’s 
recommendations to improve IO phase two target development 
and prioritization. 
3. Palantir Target Development 
Palantir’s intelligence foundation makes it an ideal 
tool for the creation of target folders. Each object entered 
in Palantir includes properties describing the target, a 
smart-list history of related events performed by the 
target, a smart-list of related entities and the ability to 
“hang” notes, electronic media and documents into the 
object’s property window.  In Figure 11, a person serves as 
a Palantir object example, but the target folder could 
contain any classification of target type.  Beyond 
individual target development, Palantir’s inherent 
relationship analysis design allows the user to meaningfully 
connect individual target folders to other target folders 
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through actual relationships based on history, organization, 
affiliation or any specified criteria.  An example network, 
depicted in Figure 12, illustrates Palantir’s ability to 
connect individual target folders to other target folders to 
build a network. An important Palantir target development 
paradigm is that an event of any affiliation can be entered 
and therefore modeled into the associated investigation.  
This is significant for two reasons.  First, events and 
objects related to the target can be dynamically and 
accurately modeled versus being compartmented or segmented 
into individual folders. Secondly, both intentional and 
unintentional tasks and effects, regardless of affiliation, 
can be introduced into the target development graph to be 
inclusive of the action and counter-action flow of 
warfighting.  For example, a hostile protest against a 
friendly force’s occupation of a neutral town can be modeled 
in the investigation since the hostile protest would possess 
a relationship to other objects in Palantir’s repository.  
Therefore, the fictional protest could be modeled as an 
unintentional effect generated by the friendly force’s 
occupation, an intentional effect caused by hostile design, 
or as both events.  Beyond the causal analysis, the protest 
possesses temporal, geographic, qualitative attributes, and 
other relationships that can be captured in the Palantir 
investigation.  Palantir’s design facilitates the 
documentation of complex events to produce a comprehensive 
picture that facilitates understanding.  Although this could 
be treated as intelligence support to IO, the analysis can 
be directly used by the HOT methodology because the 




Figure 11.   Palantir Related View, Summary Window 
 
 
Figure 12.   Palantir Graph View Window 
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4. Palantir Target Prioritization 
Palantir’s ability to build and expand individual 
targeting folders into complex but meaningful networks 
facilitates the ability to comprehensively prioritize 
targets.  Palantir’s intelligence analyst functionality 
allows it to be used to achieve prioritization solutions: 
• Rack and Stack:  Since target value can be 
assigned as a property in the Palantir related 
view window, a user can perform a data repository 
search based upon a target’s overall value.  This 
smart value target list could be represented 
through text or visually highlighted in the 
graph’s network work. 
• Low or High Hanging Fruit.  By simply adding a 
target accessibility value to each possible 
target, a user can perform a data repository 
search based on perceived accessibility. 
• Any Value(s) Search.  Based on a commander’s 
guidance, all targets or typed targets could 
contain a data set of evaluated values.  For 
example, a target could contain a subjective value 
based on the concept of legitimacy expressed as 
low, medium or high.  This value could be searched 
and then ranked to provide a list of targets based 
solely on the idea of legitimacy.  Since friendly 
and neutral target audiences can be added into the 
Palantir repository, the IO capabilities of 
Operational Security (OPSEC) and Information 
Assurance (IA) could be enhanced by viewing 
friendly vulnerabilities through the valued 
search.  Finally, since multi-variable searches 
can be conducted, IO planners could conduct a 
valued search based upon legitimacy and target 
value together.   
• Relationship Search.  Based on a specific target, 
a relationship search can be performed to provide 
a layered depth of closeness to the target.   
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• Nodal or Network Analysis. Since Palantir is a 
social network analysis tool, it can examine and 
present target sets as part of a network.  
Therefore, based upon the system’s definition, 
entire networks can be targeted.  
5. HOT Methodology using Palantir as a Tool 
Beyond the benefits of using Palantir for general 
target development and prioritization, Palantir’s flexible 
design allows the user to combine the techniques for target 
development and prioritization with the HOT methodology.  In 
order to explain the HOT methodology with Palantir, a simple 
network was created representing a fictional target system. 
The network involves person #1, who is an acquaintance of 
person #2, the boss of person #1a and person #1b and a 
resident of the city.  Persons #1a and #1b are also known 
coworkers, but are not residents of the city.  Person #2 is 
a resident of the city and an owner of the computer. This 
brief narrative is succinctly illustrated in Figure 13.  As 
an assumption, the targets and the network can be developed 
and prioritized based upon available intelligence and 
targeting objectives.  At this point, the HOT methodology 
can be applied to the network. 
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Figure 13.   Sample Network, Palantir Graph View 
To make use of the HOT method, IO tasks and effects are 
introduced into the model as entity objects.  The IO task is 
related to the target by attaching a relationship edge 
between the task and target.  Next, the associated IO effect 
stems from its target to produce the cause and effect 
relationship into the model.  Multiple targets can be 
related to either the IO task or effect as it applies.  In 
this case, an IO task is directed at the computer producing 
an associated effect (see Figure 14).  Since person #2 owns 
the computer, he will also be affected.  Therefore, an edge 
was drawn not only from the computer, but to person #2 to 
convey the full scope of the IO effect. More important than 
just the network diagram is the user’s ability to explain 




Figure 14.   IO task and effect depicted on Palantir’s graph 
view 
In order to capture the HOT methodology’s value in 
understanding complexity, individual start and end times 
were entered into the properties portion of the IO tasks and 
effects repository.  In this case, both the IO task and 
effect possessed identical life spans, representing a CNO 
denial of service attack. By selecting the IO task and 
effect, a user can visually see the effects chain caused by 
the intended IO task and effect.  Figure 15 illustrates the 
timeline view of the IO task and effect shown from 0400 to 
0500 local time aided by the graph view to visually explain 
the targeting scheme.  This targeting shows a first order 
example, but Palantir could enable the user to select person 
#2 to see the second order relationships.   Although not 
designed for this purpose, Palantir allows its users to 
apply this technique that always includes the HOT 
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methodology’s ball and chain, priori and lateral effects 
positions into target development and prioritization 
solutions.  Additionally, indicators treated as MOWs can be 
collected and subsequently introduced into the model.  Based 
on the HOT methodology, the MOWs can be classified as PI, 
UI, or NIs as they derive from an effect.  These indicators 
can then possess attributes, relationships and temporal 
values of their own to further provide a complete picture, 
allowing the targeting cycle to function as a cycle. 
 
 
Figure 15.   IO Task and Effect relationship with its 
associated temporal information. 
One of the most important paradigms to understand with 
Palantir is that the software does not publish the user’s 
work until specifically directed, thereby allowing the 
analyst to use the concept of competing hypotheses to arrive 
at the best answer possible.  If an analyst is unable to 
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confirm or disprove one of the competing hypotheses, 
Palantir allows the user to save multiple investigations 
with different data variations on individual objects and 
networks.  To further support this paradigm, Palantir keeps 
a useful “snap shot” history as the user adjusts with the 
investigation.  At any time the user can go backwards or 
decide to automatically export all or selected iterations to 
a Microsoft PowerPoint or HTML file. This utility supports 
HOT methodology feasibility because planners can actually 
and efficiently construct the Weak Actor, Devil’s Advocate, 
and Crystal Ball perspectives.  More than just providing 
answers, Palantir allows for an easy iterative processes to 
occur.   
Another advantage of Palantir’s utility involves the 
ability to war game targeting actions.  IO tasks, effects, 
and measures of worth can be introduced to see how a 
targeting scheme could play out. Palantir’s visual ability 
to serve as a standalone briefing tool allows the 
preponderance of the IO targeting rigor to focus on the work 
instead of devoting precious time towards production and 
briefing.  Although not designed as a targeting tool, 
Palantir’s intelligence utility combined with its flexible 
relationship designs enables the HOT methodology to become a 








A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Despite finding problems with IO target development and 
prioritization in terms of doctrine, practice and 
technology, this study put forward five recommendations.  
Though focused on target development and prioritization, the 
study examined all phases of the joint targeting cycle.  In 
this examination, relevant and connected aspects of other 
phases, most notably phase six (assessment), were included 
to ensure the study’s problem definition and recommendations 
were not in isolation.  Key summary of findings involving 
research findings and recommendations are listed below: 
• Doctrinally, IO targeting currently lacks an 
independent methodology to conduct phase two 
target development and prioritization. 
• Phase two (target development and prioritization) 
and phase six (assessment) are closely linked from 
an IO perspective despite their numerical ranking. 
• IO targeting represents a military wicked problem 
set. 
• Currently Measures of Effects (MOE) tend to only 
capture success, but could systemically disregard 
negative and undeveloped indicators. 
• The present unavailability of an IO JMEM 
equivalent limits the ability to match non-lethal 
effects with a commander’s objectives. 
• Based on the SME questionnaire and subsequent 
interviews, IO practitioners understand and employ 




consistent and common base independent methodology 
and tool to conduct target prioritization and 
development. 
• The adoption of a Measure of Worth (MOW) model 
would allow IO targeting to conduct better 
assessment of indicators by classifying whether 
the indicators contribute to, work against or 
could possibly relate to the desired IO effect.  
By looking at the number, relevance, and weight of 
the now classified Positive Indicators (PIs), 
Unknown Indicators (UIs), and Negative Indicators 
(NIs), one can determine the actual status of 
meeting the effect’s achievement. 
• The Holistic Targeting (HOT) methodology could 
facilitates whole and complementary targeting 
solutions to efficiently develop and prioritize 
targets. 
• Compendium software facilities the process of 
creating initial IO effects in support of a 
commander’s objectives. 
• Though powerful intelligence analyst tools, 
Palantir’s relationship analysis combined with it 
flexible object definition allows the software to 
implement and automate the HOT and MOW models. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
This thesis represents an initial foray into the 
research of IO targeting.  The principal weakness in the 
research involves its inability to establish a quantifiable 
proof of concept regarding its proposed recommendations.  
However, the validation of the recommendations represents a 
steep challenge.  With this caveat in mind, several initial 
ideas were theorized during the course of the thesis work 
that appeared very suitable for future work on this thesis 
topic. 
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• Several commercially available predictive market 
software programs tailored for internal corporate 
use could be evaluated as a more elegant method to 
create ad hoc IO JMEMs.   
• From a human factors perspective, comparative 
evaluations of the HOT and other target 
development and prioritization techniques could be 
conducted by actual IO effects cells.  Ideally, 
this comparative evaluation could be done during 
an exercise or in a training context, yielding a 
mutual benefit to the participants and the 
researcher. The evaluation could incorporate 
external and internal inputs to assess the most 
efficient model, methodology, or technique. 
• Based on classification and unclassified 
relevancy, real world data could be inputted into 
the HOT and Palantir model to ascertain different 
target development and prioritization solutions.   
• Palantir’s inherently flexible object ontology 
could be modified to provide an enhanced model for 
the IO cognitive and informational domain. 
• The most ambitious proof of concept involves the 
building of a “virtual village” using Palantir.  
The virtual village concept envisions an entirely 
omniscient view of a given area of operation’s 
physical, informational and cognitive composition.  
Palantir’s geospatial plotting ability with Google 
Earth makes this very workable. Using a simulation 
format, participants conduct IO targeting using 
typical information and/or likely intelligence to 
develop applicable solutions.  The simulation’s 
solution based upon partial information is then 
compared with the omniscient picture to gradually 
identify the key independent variables required 
for targeting in a perfect world.  From an 
intelligence perspective, these isolated 
Independent Variables (IVs) become Prioritized 
Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), and from a 
targeting perspective, the IVs materialize as 
either High Value Targets (HVTs) or High Priority 
Targets (HPTs). 
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APPENDIX 
Information Operations (IO) and/or Non-Lethal Effects 
Targeting/Planning (Target Development and Prioritization) 
Questionnaire 
Point of Contact: cieva@nps.edu  
 
1. Rank: 
2. MOS or Specialty: 
3. Service: 
4. Years of service: 
5. Billet held while conducting IO or non-lethal effects 
targeting: 
6. Echelon of unit assigned to:  (For example, Battalion 
or Task Force, RCT or BCT, etc) 
7. Theatre of Service: 
a. Area of Operations (if applicable): 
8. Timeframe in theatre.  Start (YYMMDD): End   (YYMMDD): 
9. Questions. 
 
a. Did you use the Joint Publication 3-60 Targeting 
as a source or reference for your target 
development and prioritization? 
 
b. Have you ever read or referenced the JP 3-60 
Targeting Publication for target development and 
prioritization? 
 
c. What process did you use to develop and prioritize 
targets? 
 
d. Was the process a formally established SOP? If so, 
what was the source or best related source? 
 
e. Was the process based on joint or service 
doctrine?  If so, what was the source? 
 
f. If the process was informal, please provide a 
brief summary of the process used. 
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g. Did you use a (any) tools to support your target 
development and prioritization?  If so, which 
one(s)? 
 
h. Ratings.  With one (1) being the lowest and five 
(5) being the highest, please evaluate the 
strength of the following statements below on your 
target development and prioritization process 
used: 
• The process used was effects based: _____. 
• The process used was interdisciplinary: 
_____. 
• The process used was focused: _____. 
• The process used was systematic: _____. 
• The process used was effective: ______. 
• The process used was consistent: _____. 
• The process used was a byproduct of my 
theatre of operations: ______. 
• The process used would be applicable to 
neutral audiences: _____. 
• The process used would be applicable to 
adversarial audiences: _____. 
 
i. If you could improve one aspect of the process 
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